Your agent needs your password
and your credit card.
That should terrify you.
OpenClaw gives your agent a task, your credentials, and a VM it can't escape. Every byte of network traffic is decrypted and checked before it leaves. If the agent tries anything you didn't authorize, it's blocked.
Trust is a vulnerability
So we replaced it with enforcement.
Define the envelope
Which domains. Which APIs. What dollar limit. Who it can email. You declare this upfront as capability tokens — cryptographic permissions that can be narrowed but never widened.
Not config files. Signed tokens with attenuation semantics.
Sandbox everything
The agent runs in a KVM microVM with one way out: a proxy that terminates TLS and inspects every request. The agent thinks it's on the open internet. It's not.
Hardware isolation. Not a container. Not a promise.
Get receipts, not logs
Every action produces a signed receipt chained to the capability that authorized it. Not a log line that someone can edit. A cryptographic proof that a specific action was authorized by a specific grant.
Tamper-evident. Machine-verifiable. Human-readable.
You set the rules. The VM enforces them.
Three allowed domains. One credit card with a $600 ceiling. Email to you and only you. The agent doesn't get to negotiate.
The agent thinks it's alone on the internet
It's not. We terminate its TLS, read every request, and check it against the capabilities you granted. The agent never knows.
Total: $487.00 (within $600 budget)
Not logs. Receipts.
Logs can be edited. Receipts are signed. Every action is chained to the capability that authorized it — a proof, not a promise.
Stop hoping your agent behaves.
Start knowing.
If your agents touch real money, real credentials, or real people's data — you need more than a system prompt and a prayer.